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Draft not for citation. The final version of this article appears in Modern Law Review, 
Vol. 73, pp. 858-882 (2010). 
Between Law and Language: 
When Constitutionalism Goes Plural in a Globalising World♦ 
Ming-Sung Kuo* 
Abstract 
Riding the wave of globalisation, scholars and practitioners envision global 
governance as a legalised world order.  This international rule of law movement 
is centred on the idea of global constitutionalism.  However, the constitutional 
view of global governance raises fundamental questions pertaining to the nature 
of international law, the culture of constitutional orders, and the future of global 
governance: What is the added value for the international legal system to be 
viewed in constitutional terms?  How would comprehensiveness characteristic of 
traditional constitutional orders figure in an increasingly fragmented world 
order?  Does the new era of constitutionalism herald a paradigm shift in 
thinking constitutionalism?  Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, 
attempts to illuminate the idea of global constitutionalism.  Engaging with the 
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contributors to the collection, this article aims to achieve two goals.  In addition 
to providing a typology of global constitutionalism to help discern the distinct 
locales where global constitutionalism emerges and dissect its plural meanings, 
this article argues that global constitutionalism sits at the crossroads of law and 
language.  The ambiguity between legal nomos and narrative language lies at 
the heart of the current debates surrounding global constitutionalism. 
Key words: typology of global constitutionalism, supranational legality, conflict of 
constitutional laws, constitutionalised international law, global governance, constitutional 
pluralism, constitutional self-aggrandisement, constitutional mindset, legal nomos and 
narrative language  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Riding the wave of globalisation, discussions on the ‘the juridification of the new world 
order’ have spread through academic circles.1   Law is now expected to reign in 
international relations that used to be conducted according to the realist logic of power 
and interest.2  Although the new legalised world order envisioned by these discussions 
has been given different names such as ‘legal and constitutional pluralism’,3 ‘multilevel 
governance’,4 ‘societal constitutionalism’,5 or ‘transnational government networks’,6 the 
common thread that runs through these designations is a constitutional version of global 
                                                
1  See J. L. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law’ (2004) 18 Ethics & 
International Affairs 1, 2. See also J. L. Goldstein et al. (eds), Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2001).  
2 For the project of building a global rule of law in the development of modern international law, see M. 
Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques and Politics’ (2007) 70 MLR 1, 
1-3. For the predominance of national interest in realist international relations theories, see M. Koskenniemi, 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 413-509. 
3 See N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 317-359. See also G. W. 
Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 39-151. 
4 See eg C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and 
Social Regulation (Oxford, UK and Portland, OR: Hart, 2006); I. Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel 
Constitutionalism in Action’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 349; S. Picciotto, 
‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6 I•CON 457. 
5 See G. Teubner, ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation State’ in P. 
Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
327-341; G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory’ in 
C. Joerges et al. (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 3-28. 
6 See A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 8. 
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governance.7  At its core is to build constitutional ordering beyond nation-states with an 
eye to constitutionalising the world order in the global era.8  Echoing these institutional 
aspirations for constitutional ordering on a global scale is the idea of global 
constitutionalism: the normative ideals of constitutionalism such as the protection of 
human rights and the rule of law are to be projected onto the world, governing the nascent 
global arrangement of constitutional ordering.9  In the eyes of aspiring globalists, the 
envisioned constitutionalised world is a place where Leviathans would be caged by global 
constitutionalism, bidding farewell to the Hobbesian international relations of the 
Westphalian age.10 
Apparently a new era of constitutionalism is arriving.11  However, the transnational 
                                                
7 See Cohen, n 1 above, 1-11. See also Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, n 5 above; 
K.-H. Ladeur (ed), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); D. Held, 
Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1995); J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds), Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
8  See eg D. J. Elazar, Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal 
Arrangements (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); C. Walter, ‘Constitutionalizing (Inter)national 
Governance: Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an International Constitutional Law’ (2002) 
44 German Yearbook of International Law 170.  
9 See N. Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); A. Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 
16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397. 
10 See generally R. St. J. MacDonald and D. M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues 
in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). See also R. A. Falk et al., 
‘Global Constitutionalism and World Order’ in R. A. Falk et al. (eds), The Constitutional Foundations of 
World Peace (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993) 3-12. 
11 See eg M. Rosenfeld, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological 
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parallel between institutions and norms in terms of constitutionalism is not entirely 
beyond dispute, posing more questions than answers to how constitutional ordering would 
configure beyond its traditional domain of nation-states.12  Notably, the idea to conduct 
international relations in accordance with the law has a long history in modern 
international law.13  Despite the different motives behind the intellectual movement for 
the international rule of law and the divergent visions for a new world order, substituting 
order for anarchy has been the main theme in this movement.14  Thus, as the latest wave 
of the international rule of law movement, global constitutionalism raises the questions 
pertaining to the nature of international law, the culture of constitutional orders, and the 
future of global governance.  What is the ‘added value’ for the international legal system 
to be viewed in constitutional terms?  What exactly is ‘constitutional’ about current 
global governance?  How would comprehensiveness characteristic of traditional 
constitutional orders figure in an increasingly fragmented world order?  Does global 
constitutionalism simply suggest a global expansion of constitutional democracy or herald 
a paradigm shift in thinking constitutionalism?  Are we entering a new era of 
constitutionalism, or instead are we facing the end of constitutionalism as we know it?  
These are the central concerns not only to policy makers but also to legal scholars and 
                                                                                                                                             
Pluralism’ (2008) 6 I•CON 415. Notably, Hauke Brunkhorst traces the idea of global constitutionalism to 
the revolutionary changes that began in the 1940s and were already observed by Talcott Parsons in 1960. 
See H. Brunkhorst, ‘Dialectical Snares: Human Rights and Democracy in the World Society’ (2009) 2 
Ethics & Global Politics 219, 231. 
12 See generally Dobner and Loughlin (eds), n 5 above. 
13 See Koskenniemi (2007), n 2 above, 2-3. 
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political scientists in the face of variegated proposals for a global version of 
constitutionalism.  Before jumping on board the globalist bandwagon, we need to think 
through these issues so that the idea of global constitutionalism can be better grasped 
without being reduced to nothing but a fashionable label for the continuing movement for 
the international rule of law.  
Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, 
edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, is a timely and important intervention 
among scholarly attempts to throw illuminating light on the landscape of constitutionalism 
in our globalising world.  Bringing together leading legal scholars of different 
educational backgrounds on both sides of the Atlantic, this book, which comprises thirteen 
chapters and a preface by the late international law scholar Thomas M. Franck, covers a 
wide range of issues concerning global constitutionalism.  Each chapter aims to address 
the practical and theoretical cutting edge issues of global governance in relation to 
constitutionalism as noted above.  Moreover, as reflected in its structure and selected 
themes, the book points to a typology of global constitutionalism, shedding light on the 
diversity of perspectives on and approaches to this emerging field. 
While the breadth of the topics discussed and the typology of global 
constitutionalism portrayed in the book seem to provide a definitive guide to the studies of 
global constitutionalism, the question mark at the end of its main title ‘Ruling the World?’ 
suggests the ambivalence the contributors to this collection harbour about global 
                                                                                                                                             
14 See Koskenniemi (2001), n 2 above. 
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constitutionalism.  In contrast to traditional constitutionalism rooted in national political 
communities,15 the nature of global constitutionalism, which is not underpinned by a 
global political community,16 is unclear. Does global constitutionalism mean a set of 
emerging global legal norms? Or does it amount to a new narrative framework within 
which the stories about global governance would be told?  The ambiguity between legal 
nomos and narrative language,17 this article contends, not only constitutes the central 
concern of this book but also lies at the heart of the current debates surrounding the idea 
of global constitutionalism. 
This article argues that when constitutionalism goes global, its meaning cannot be 
adequately understood within the confines of traditional constitutionalism.  Rather, 
global constitutionalism has plural meanings, which need to be dissected to do justice to 
the novel, emerging global version of constitutionalism.  This article aims to cast 
theoretical light on the ambiguity concerning the identity of global constitutionalism by 
situating global constitutionalism at the crossroads of law and language: sometimes global 
constitutionalism in light of conflict of laws is considered a rule of engagement or 
                                                
15 See eg U. K. Preuss, ‘The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe’ in M. 
Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional 
Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 211, 213.  
16 See A. von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from 
Germany’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 223, 233-236. Cf U. K. Preuss, ‘Equality of 
States—Its Meaning in a Constitutionalized Global Order’ (2008) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 
17, 41-45 (2008). 
17 This ambiguity bears greatly on the Coverian nexus of nomos and narratives. See R. M. Cover, ‘The 
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4-68. This 
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conflict, which would provide clear guidance for human and societal interactions as the 
legal system does; at other times, however, global constitutionalism amounts to a new 
language in which issues surrounding global governance and its corresponding legal order 
are framed and examined.  Before going to the two-faced identity of global 
constitutionalism, this article first reveals the typology of global constitutionalism as 
suggested in the book, which would help to discern the distinct locales where global 
constitutionalism arises and thus to illuminate its plural meanings. 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PLURALITY: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY 
OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. Re-imagining international organisations: global constitutionalism 
as supranational legality 
The first new frontier where global constitutionalism emerges is traditional international 
organisations and other legal regimes, which constitute the theme of the second part of the 
book (chs 4-8).  International organisations and other international legal regimes such as 
the United Nations (UN) human rights system are traditionally regarded as established and 
operating under the framework of international law.  What is characteristic of these 
international law regimes is that their authorities are attributed to the volition of their 
contracting parties. 18   They are binding only when the states have consented to 
                                                                                                                                             
subject will be further addressed later. 
18  See M. Koskenniemi, ‘Introduction’ in M. Koskenniemi (ed), Sources of International Law 
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subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction and authority of these international legal 
bodies. 19   Thus, international treaties that ground the authority of international 
organisations tend to be lacking in brevity and more detailed than state constitutions.20  
Moreover, in contrast with traditional constitutional interpretation, in which the purposive 
or teleological methods are adopted and the doctrine of implied powers is well received,21 
strict textualism is preferred in interpreting international treaties.22 
However, paralleling the pursuit of legalising international relations, traditional 
                                                                                                                                             
(Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2000) xi, xii. 
19 It is noteworthy that the UN Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
have long been advocated as binding on non-members and members alike. See S. Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the 
United Nations Security Council and the European Community’ (1993) 4 EJIL 256, 262. 
20 Cf J. H. H. Weiler, ‘On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography’ (2005) 3 I•CON 
173, 174. Undeniably, the actual length of a constitution and that of a treaty of an organisational type may 
vary. Yet, in terms of style, brevity weighs more in a constitution than in a treaty. See S. C. Siberson, 
‘Worth Doing Well—The Improvable European Union Constitution’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 587, 600-601. Many thanks to Tom Poole for drawing my attention to the delicacy in 
comparing the styles of constitutions and treaties. 
21 See generally A. Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, tr 
S. Bashi, 2005). Stephen Gardbaum in another place identifies the lesser use and legitimacy of the purposive 
or teleological method of judicial reasoning as a feature of ‘U.S. interpretive exceptionalism’. See S. 
Gardbaum, ‘The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism’ (2008) 107 Michigan 
Law Review 391, 410. For the doctrine of implied powers in the United States, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
22 See A. Glashausser, ‘What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding’ (2005) 
73 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1243, 1255-1269. Notably, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of the basic treaties of the European Union (EU) and its 
predecessors is quite the opposite. The opposite direction in which the ECJ has gone in interpreting the EU 
and other basic treaties has been taken as an evidence of the constitutionalisation of the EU. The relationship 
between the ECJ jurisprudence and the EU’s constitutionalisation will be addressed later.  
 10 
international organisations and other legal regimes have been undergoing the processes of 
constitutionalisation. 23   The foremost example of those that take the path of 
constitutionalisation is the EU.  According to Joseph Weiler, the constitutionalisation of 
the EU consists mainly of four substantive judge-made doctrines concerning the status and 
nature of Community law vis-à-vis the municipal legal systems of the member states:24 
direct effect,25 supremacy,26 human rights,27 and implied powers.28  Through these 
doctrines of the ECJ, the legal relationship between the Community and member states are 
no longer international but rather has become supranational, transforming the EU legal 
                                                
23 For the ambiguous meaning of constitutionalisation, see D. Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the 
World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 15-18; K. Milewicz, ‘Emerging Patterns of Global 
Constitutionalization: Toward a Conceptual Framework’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
413-436. Cf M. Loughlin, ‘What Is Constitutionalisation?’ in The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, n 5 above, 
47-69. 
24 The EU as an umbrella regime consisted of three ‘pillars’ during the pre-Lisbon Treaty era, which had 
been in place since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. In a strict legal sense, Community law, which resided in 
the first pillar, ie European Community, was distinct from the EU (or Union) law. However, the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009 has brought about the ‘de-pillarisation’ of the EU structure. 
It is noteworthy that the de-pillarisation will not completely eradicate the traces of the pillar structure. See R. 
A. Wessel, ‘The Constitutional Unity of the European Union: The Increasing Irrelevance of the Pillar 
Structure’ in J. Wouters at al. (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009) 
283-306. 
25 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
26 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
27 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. 
28 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263. 
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system into a constitutional order.29  Thus, what characterises global constitutionalism in 
relation to international organisations is the move from the state consent-based 
international treaty law to a sui generis but autonomous legal order independent of 
international and municipal law, which this article calls ‘supranational legality’.30 
Continuing to elaborate on the development of ‘supranational constitutionalism’ 
(151) in the EU, Neil Walker’s chapter further notes that the EU itself is in the process of 
constitutional transformation.31  Taking up the issue, Walker reflects on the ‘framing 
logic’ of modern constitutionalism.  He points out that the constitutional way of thinking 
‘the collective forms of practical reasoning we call “politics’’’ operates through five 
‘framing registers’, ie ‘juridical’, ‘political-institutional’, ‘authorising’, ‘social’, and 
‘discursive’ (152).  Under the ‘framing logic’, modern constitutionalism assumes ‘certain 
clearly differentiated containers of social space’ and centres on the ‘demarcation and 
                                                
29 See J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other 
Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 19-25. Literature on the 
constitutionalisation of the EU is enormous. See eg T. Christiansen and C. Reh, Constitutionalizing the 
European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); B. Rittberger and F. Schimmelfennig, The 
Constitutionalization of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2007); A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial 
Construction of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
30 What is characteristic of the constitutionalisation of an international organisation is the transformed 
relationship between it and its member states: from international to supranational. See A. Stone Sweet, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of the EU: Steps towards Supranational Polity’ in S. Fabbrini (ed), Democracy and 
Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Exploring the Post-National Governance 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) 44-56. Given that the rule of law plays a central role in the efforts of reshaping 
international relations by international law, the constitutionalisation of international organisations is 
characterised as supranational legality in this article. 
31 See eg M.-S. Kuo, ‘From Myth to Fiction: Why a Legalist-Constructivist Rescue of European 
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organization of social space’ (153-162).  Walker’s contribution illustrates how the EU 
example of global constitutionalism reveals the possibility and limitation of the 
self-transformative potential of bounded modern constitutionalism in redrawing the 
boundaries of social space (151-152, 162-176.).32  
In addition to the EU regional body, the UN and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) are showcases of how ‘constitution talk’ (161) spreads into traditional 
international organisations.  These two examples are representative.  The one has long 
been taken as the prototype of world government;33 the other is emerging as the most 
powerful global regulatory regime that includes a mandatory judicial type of dispute 
resolution mechanism.34  Nevertheless, reading these two international bodies through 
constitutional lens is not out of question, as reflected in the distinct attitudes towards them 
in the book.  Raising the question The UN Charter – A Global Constitution? in the title 
of his contribution, Michael W. Doyle restricts the constitutional reading of the UN 
Charter to the practice of ‘supranationality’ in UN operations such as the Millennium 
                                                                                                                                             
Constitutional Ordering Fails’ (2009) 29 OJLS 579-602. 
32 For the boundedness of modern constitutionalism, see M.-S. Kuo, ‘Reconciling Constitutionalism with 
Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris (forthcoming), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1533483 (last visited 23 March 2010). See 
also U. K. Preuss, ‘Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable 
Concept?’ in The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, n 5 above, 23, 26-29, 32-33; H. Lindahl, ‘A-Legality: 
Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries’ (2010) 73 MLR 30-56. 
33 See generally G. Clark and L. B. Sohn, World Peace through World Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 3rd ed, 1966). 
34 See D. Z. Cass, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as 
the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 EJIL 39, 49-52. 
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Development Goals (115, 131).  Defined as the institutional feature that ‘permits 
authoritative decisions without continuous [state] consent’ (115), 35  Doyle notes, 
‘supranationality’ suggests moving the UN regime beyond the definition of traditional 
international organisations (125-131).  In contrast to Doyle’s cautious identification of 
supranationality in UN practices, Bardo Fassbender unreservedly defends a constitutional 
rendering of the UN Charter, which he helped to initiate in the 1990s,36 by a comparative 
examination of the UN Charter and existing state constitutions (137-141).37  
Corresponding to Doyle’s and Fassbender’s contrasting assessments of the UN in 
constitutional terms, Dunoff’s and Trachtman’s contributions illustrate the opposite 
attitudes towards the constitutionalisation of the WTO.  Although both Dunoff and 
Trachtman address the role of politics in the constitutional discourse regarding the WTO, 
they argue from different perspectives.  While Dunoff adopts a critical stance (192-202), 
Trachtman argues from a rationalist perspective of ‘constitutional economics’ (212-216, 
228).  Moreover, the difference in their political perspectives leads to their opposite 
appraisals of the WTO.  From a rationalist perspective, Trachtman unreservedly 
embraces the WTO in constitutional terms (216-228).  He attributes the 
constitutionalisation of the WTO, the characteristic of which is its supranational feature of 
                                                
35 In chapter 3, Andreas L. Paulus questions Doyle’s broad definition of supranationality (104). 
36 See B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community’ 
(1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529-619. 
37 Although Fassbender focuses attention on the similarity of the UN Charter to a national constitution, 
he does not equate the Charter with its national counterpart. Rather, he argues that ‘[t]he Charter is part of a 
more inclusive constitutional process’, which involves ‘“the constitutional bylaws” of the international 
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dispute settlement (217),38 to the motives to resolve transaction costs and strategic 
problems in international trade by constitutional means (213).  In contrast, Dunoff 
focuses attention on the politics behind the movement to rethink the WTO as being on the 
path of constitutionalisation and shows scepticism with respect to various theories to 
characterise the WTO as a constitutionalised body. 39   Disputing Trachtman’s 
functionalist approach to constitutionalising the WTO (182-83), Dunoff suggests that we 
understand efforts to constitutionalise the WTO more prescriptively than descriptively 
(201-202).  Seen in this light, the constitutionalisation of the WTO is intertwined with 
the politics to ‘give [the WTO] “the legitimacy of higher law – irreversible, irresistible, 
and comprehensive”’ (201).  
In addition to the regional and global organisations, international human rights 
regimes stand at the centre of the discourse on global constitutionalism.  Less 
institutionalised and centralised than formal international organisations such as the UN, 
the WTO, and the EU (239-240), international human rights regimes play an equally 
pivotal role in the development of global constitutionalism because of their normative 
importance.  This theme runs through Stephen Gardbaum’s contribution.  Gardbaum 
                                                                                                                                             
community’ (145). 
38 In contrast to intergovernmental mechanism, Trachtman characterises the dispute settlement of the 
WTO as ‘transnational’ rather than ‘supranational’ (217). 
39 On the one hand, Dunoff questions whether the three primary functions of constitution, which are 
dubbed with ‘enabling’, ‘constraining’, and ‘supplemental’ constitutionalisation, respectively, apply to the 
WTO (180-184). Rejecting the functionalist approach to constitutionalising the WTO, Dunoff also disputes 
the institutionalist, normativist, and juristocrat conceptions of constitution in conceptualising the WTO as a 
constitutional body (184-192). 
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notes that there are two dimensions in the constitutionalisation of international human 
rights regimes.  First, he regards the recent efforts of giving international human rights 
law the specific status of (quasi-)constitutional law in municipal legal systems as an 
advancement of the traditional discussion on the domestic incorporation of international 
human rights treaties (238-244).  However, Gardbaum’s focus is on the second 
dimension of constitutionalising human rights regimes.  Resting this second 
constitutionalisation of human rights on the distinction between treaty and constitution, 
Gardbaum attributes constitutional character to international human rights law because 
human rights regimes penetrate municipal legal systems and impose legal obligations on 
states that are not fixed in the constitutive treaties of international human rights regimes 
(245-251).  With the enhancement of the doctrine of direct effect and the departure from 
strict textualism in interpretation, international human rights treaties are 
constitutionalised,40 ‘mak[ing] a transition from being…horizontal, intergovernmental 
[bodies] to a more vertical supranational, or autonomous [regime]’ ( 245).41 
 
B. Emerging from the imbroglio of constitutional orders: global 
constitutionalism as conflict of laws 
As a point of departure for the third part of the book, the theme of the constitutionalisation 
of international human rights regimes points to the second frontier opened up by global 
                                                
40 Franck also noted the relationship between the changing method of treaty interpretation and the 
constitutionalisation of treaty law in the preface (xi). 
41 In his contribution, Paulus holds doubts about the supranationality of international human rights 
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constitutionalism: the crisscrossing of constitutional domains.  To be sure, the imbroglio 
of distinctive constitutional orders is not new to constitutional theory.  A central topic in 
comparative constitutional law literature is concerned with the delineation of and the 
negotiation between constitutional jurisdictions.42  However, global constitutionalism 
complicates and sharpens comparative constitutional law scholarship: global 
constitutionalism functions as a special conflict of laws in mediating distinct constitutional 
orders, whether they are national or transnational.43 
While Gardbaum suggests that a constitutionalised international human rights regime 
seems to attain a higher normative status vis-à-vis state constitutions (245), 44  the 
landscape of global constitutionalism is much more complex than a hierarchical legal 
order.  As part of his grand project on the cosmopolitan turn in constitutionalism 
(261-262), Mattias Kumm’s chapter takes up the issue of the relationship between 
constitutional orders.  Kumm reconceptualises the relationship between international and 
                                                                                                                                             
regimes (104). 
42 See S. Choudhry, ‘Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in S. Choudhry 
(ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1-36. 
43 See C. Joerges, ‘Constitutionalism in Postnational Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in the 
EU and the WTO’ in Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, n 4 above, 
491; C. Joerges, ‘Reconceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict 
of Laws’ in B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007) 311. See also V. C. Jackson, Constitutional 
Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). The argument here is inspired 
by Christian Joerges’s comments on the author’s ‘Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a 
Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering’, n 32 above. 
44 See also Koskenniemi (2007), n 2 above, 15. 
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municipal legal systems as one involving different constitutional domains, which is to be 
governed according to constitutional pluralism without being trapped in the monism vs. 
dualism debate in traditional international law (274-288).  As a ‘rule[] of engagement’ 
for distinct constitutional domains (289), constitutional pluralism rests its legitimacy on 
procedures.  What he calls ‘complex procedural legitimacy’ comprises jurisdictional 
legitimacy and due process (290-291).  The former is embedded in the departure from 
the idea of sovereignty to the principle of subsidiarity (291-295); the latter is a twofold 
concept, comprising electoral accountability and standards of good governance derived 
from domestic administrative law (296-303).  Taken together, Kumm suggests a 
conflict-of-laws understanding of global constitutionalism, albeit in the name of the rule 
of engagement (278, 289-290, 307-310). 
While addressing other issues regarding global constitutionalism, Kumm’s 
foregrounding the idea of constitutional pluralism sets the stage for the next two 
interventions in how to navigate the crisscrossing constitutional landscape in the 
postnational era.45  On his part, Daniel Halberstam argues that constitutonal pluralism is 
characteristic of both the European legal order and the separation of powers in the United 
States constitutional system.  At the heart of constitutional pluralism in Europe is the 
unsettled relationship between the EU and member state legal orders (330-331), whereas 
                                                
45 See J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ed 
and tr M Pensky, 2001). Samantha Besson also discusses constitutional pluralism to conclude her chapter 
(399-406), which will be addressed later. Other chapters that also note the role of constitutional pluralism in 
global constitutionalism include Dunoff and Trachtman (32), Walker (165), and Dunoff (203-204). 
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the American version of constitutional pluralism, ie departmentalism, refers to the 
contestation around claims to being the final arbiter of constitutional controversies among 
the three branches of the federal government as well as the people (331-332).46  What is 
common between these two examples of constitutional pluralism is that ‘the unsettled 
nature of final legal authority is an enduring and essential characteristic of each system’ 
(336).  Taking constitutional pluralism seriously, Halberstam proposes ‘constitutional 
heterarchy’ as the form of managing potential constitutional conflicts among different 
institutional actors (328).  Instead of grounding the management of conflicts in any 
hierarchy outside the system, constitutional conflicts involved in the ‘intersystemic’ 
engagement in Europe (328) and the ‘interinstitutional’ engagement in the United States 
(337) are managed within a nonhierarchical structure.  In other words, Halberstam 
highlights the role of global constitutionalism in managing constitutional conflicts through 
the values of voice, expertise, and rights within the spontaneous, decentralised, and 
immanent ordering of constitutional heterarchy (336-355). 
Following this line of thinking, Miguel Poiares Maduro focuses attention on the 
changing role of the judiciary in the face of constitutional pluralism.  In addition to the 
                                                
46 A distinction should be noted between constitutional pluralism in European constitutionalism and 
constitutional departmentalism in American constitutional theory. In Europe, constitutional pluralism is 
proposed in response to the competition between the ECJ and national constitutional jurisdictions regarding 
who should have the final say in interpreting the constitutive legal texts of the EU and member states. It is 
aimed at dissolving the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. See Walker, n 3 above, 348-350. In 
contrast, constitutional departmentalism in the United States is concerned with the issue of judicial 
supremacy itself. See R. Post and R. Siegel, ‘Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy’ (2004) 92 California Law Review 1027-1043. 
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required changes of the modalities of judicial reasoning in response to constitutional 
pluralism (361-371), Maduro emphasises the role of judicial dialogues in institutional 
choice (371-374).47  Moreover, he indicates that the constitutionalisation of international 
law bodies complicates the relationship between constitutional domains.  Thus, Maduro 
distinguishes between the teloi of the judiciary in the face of internal and external 
constitutional pluralism.  In the context of internal constitutional pluralism where a 
certain legal order supported by its own political community is supposed,48 the telos of 
courts is to maintain the integrity and coherence of that legal order (374).  In contrast, 
faced with external constitutional pluralism,49 courts are concerned with minimising 
potential jurisdictional conflicts (375).  Aided by (meta-)teleological reasoning and a 
systematic understanding of the legal order (368-370), Maduro argues, judicial 
interpretation and dialogues emerge as the institutional response to the mediation of the 
possible constitutional conflicts resulting from constitutional pluralism (370). 
Despite assuming different names, contributions from Kumm, Halberstam, and 
Maduro converge on managing to resolve the issue of regime collision as a result of 
complex constitutionalisation.50  Their focus on constitutional pluralism revolves around 
                                                
47 The role of judicial dialogues in global constitutionalism is also noted in the following chapters: 
Dunoff and Trachtman (35) and Besson (405-406). 
48 In her contribution to the collection, Besson defines internal constitutional pluralism differently, 
referring to the coexistence of constitutional norms stemming from different sources or regimes within the 
international order instead of a national or transnational political community (399-400). 
49 Besson also discusses external constitutional pluralism in a similar way (402-406). 
50 See A. Fisher-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, 1014-1017. See also 
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the role of global constitutionalism as a special conflict of laws in resolving the imbroglio 
of constitutional orders.51 
 
C. Remaking the international legal system: global constitutionalism as 
constitutionalised international law 
In addition to the constitutionalisation of distinct international law regimes as 
supranational bodies and the management of the collision between constitutional regimes, 
another dimension of global constitutionalism is concerned with the world legal order 
itself.52  In this third frontier, global constitutionalism figures as constitutionalised 
international law by remaking the general international legal system on the domestic 
model of constitutional ordering.53  In this way, the international legal system is not 
merely a set of norms based on state consent with an eye to regulating the relations 
between states.  Rather, international law has evolved into the fundamental law that 
governs international relations and constrains state behaviours in the name of 
                                                                                                                                             
M. Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law 
and Globalization’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9, 12-13. 
51 Global constitutionalism as a special conflict of laws or its equivalent is also noted in the following 
contributions: Dunoff and Trachtman (14, 30-35), Paulus (85), Trachtman (225) as well as Besson (405). 
52 Cf D. Grimm, ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization’ (2005) 12 Constellations 447, 
458. 
53 See Peters, n 9 above; von Bogdandy, n 16 above; Preuss, n 16 above, 35-41; S. C. Breau, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of the International Legal Order’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 545. 
See also J. Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity, ed and tr C. Cronin, 2006) 115-193. 
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‘international constitution’.54 
The effort to remake the general international legal system into an international 
constitution can be examined from functional and historical perspectives.  In chapter 1, 
Dunoff and Trachtman give a functionalist account of the rise of global constitutionalism 
in relation to constitutionalising the international legal system.  Their joint contribution 
attributes the demand for international constitutionalisation to globalisation and 
fragmentation (5-9).  On the one hand, the denser legal and institutional interactions 
among state and non-state actors as a consequence of globalisation increase the needs for 
new transnational organisations and the corresponding constitutionalised transnational 
legal order (5-6).  As international constitutional law, the international legal system not 
only functions to enable and constrain the new international organisations but also to 
supplement the insufficiency of state constitutions (9-18).  On the other hand, Dunoff 
and Trachtman’s introductory chapter notes the emergence of international 
constitutionalisation as a response to concerns over the fragmentation of international 
legal system (6-7). 55   With the growth of international tribunals, the increase of 
international lex specialis, and the multiplication of transnational regulatory regimes, the 
international legal system becomes fragmented, giving rise to the demand for an 
                                                
54 See Breau, n 53 above, 547-557. See also B. Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional 
Law’ in Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, n 10 
above, 837. 
55 The relationship between the fragmentation of the international legal system and the rise of global 
constitutionalism is also noted by the following contributors: Dunoff (197), Trachtman (223-226), Kumm 
(279), and Halberstam (326, 355). 
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international constitution (6-9).  Under a constitutional system, legal unity rather than 
fragmentation is expected to emerge from the variegated transnational legal fora.56  
Picking up the constitutional response to the fragmentation of the international legal 
system (82-87), Paulus considers the drive for international constitutionalism from a 
historical perspective.  Paulus first traces the origin of international constitutionalism to 
the debate on the legality of international ‘law’ in the early twentieth century (72-74).57  
From the perspective of ‘formal’ constitution, the systematic nature of international law, 
which is ascribed to the political choices of sovereign states as the secondary rules on 
international lawmaking, appears to be sufficient to found its constitutional structure (74).  
Considering the horizontal, interstate quality of sovereignty underlying the formal 
coherence of international law, however, Paulus points out that ‘superior unity’ is still 
missing in the international system of formal rules (75).  As a result, a mere systematic 
reading of the international legal system does not amount to international 
constitutionalism.  Rather, a constitutional rendering of international law must 
presuppose the existence of its corresponding institutions (75).   
Nevertheless, looking closely at the relationship between institutionalism and 
constitutionalism, Paulus is cautious about the formal approach to international 
constitutionalism.  He notes the ineffectiveness of international institutions in enforcing 
international law in comparison with the domestic constitutional model.  This 
institutional weakness compromises the constitutional character of the international legal 
                                                
56 Cf Picciotto, n 4 above, 461. 
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system (76-81).  On the other hand, the increasing institutionalisation and organisation in 
the international legal system only results in ‘[p]artial constitutionalizations’ (82), 
intensifying the fragmentation of the world legal order (69-70).  Pace Dunoff and 
Trachtman’s joint work, Paulus argues that a formal understanding of international 
constitutionalism associated with institutionalism is not a necessary response to the 
fragmentation debate (85-86).  Departing from the formalist position, Paulus urges an 
understanding of the international legal system under the substantive paradigm of 
constitutionalism (87).  On this view, what matters to the debate on international 
constitutionalism is whether the international legal order measures up to jus cogens, the 
basic principles of international law, and constitutional principles (87-107).  In other 
words, from Paulus’s point of view, the debate surrounding global constitutionalism 
should be focused on whether the international legal system actually operates in 
accordance with constitutional values, including democracy, rule of law, separation of 
powers, human rights, equality, solidarity, and the division of competences at the different 
levels of constitutional orders (94-106).  
To sum up, with respect to the world legal order itself, global constitutionalism 
materialises as the international legal system is rendered in the constitutional mould.  
However, as Paulus admits, ‘international law may never possess a constitution in the 
strict sense of domestic constitutions’ (88), even if he envisions international 
constitutionalism as substantiated with constitutional principles on the domestic model.  
                                                                                                                                             
57 Besson also points out this historical fact in her chapter (381-382). 
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The tension implicit in the constitutional rendering of international law concerns the 
issues of translation and mindset surrounding the identity of global constitutionalism, 
which are discussed next. 
 
III. TRANSLATION AND MINDSET: OF THE IDENTITY OF GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Among the many questions resulting from global constitutionalism is whether global 
constitutionalism is simply a global extension of the state model of constitutionalism as 
we know it.  As Paulus has suggested, the answer is probably not (88).  If global 
constitutionalism is not a simple constitutional transplant from the domestic constitutional 
order to the world legal order, it requires translation and a change of constitutional 
mindset to make sense of the meaning of constitutionalism in the globalising world, ie the 
identity of global constitutionalism.58 
Relating her concluding chapter to the constitutional rendering of the international 
legal system, Besson brings the issue of translation to the fore by revisiting the idea of 
constituent power (383, 388-389).59  Aware of its ties to a political community (396),60 
she reframes the concept of constituent power on her innovative model of international 
                                                
58 See also N. Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in J. H. H. Weiler 
and M. Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) 27-54. Cf Koskenniemi, n 50 above, 12-23. 
59 Dunoff also notes ‘the problem of translation’ in his chapter (203). 
60 See generally Loughlin and Walker (eds), n 15 above. 
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community whose members include states and individuals (395).61  In this way, she 
argues for ‘demoi-cratic legitimacy’ in the place of traditional democracy (388-389, 
393-399).  Specifically, considering the continuing existence of states and the 
coexistence of multiple national political communities in a constitutionalised international 
order, Besson acknowledges the importance of the idea of constituent power and adapts it 
to the complex multilayered ‘international community of communities’ (395-398).   
In showing the way out of the democracy deficit facing global constitutionalism 
through a revised conception of constituent power (384), she further addresses the issues 
regarding the relationship among different legal regimes in the international legal order 
and that between the international legal order and state constitutional orders.  Although 
she conceptualises these two relationships as internal constitutional pluralism and external 
constitutional pluralism respectively (399, 402), at the core of her proposal is to manage 
both relationships in terms of the democratic quality of each legal regime or order 
involved on a case-by-case basis (400-406).  Based on her revised conception of 
constituent power, Besson further argues that international law is not prima facie less 
democratic than national constitutions (404).  Thus, she not only manages to translate the 
idea of constituent power to global constitutionalism but also suggests a different mindset 
in dealing with the potential regime collisions as a result of the multiplication of 
constitutional orders. 
In concluding both her contribution and the collection, Besson highlights the issues  
                                                
61 Cf Preuss, n 16 above, 41-45. 
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arising from global constitutionalism: the unity vs. fragmentation debate on the 
international legal system, the global legal empire vs. non-constitutional international law 
divide, the relationship among the national, regional, and international constitutional 
orders, and the future of the EU constitution as well (406-407).  While she tries to 
translate these questions into one about constitutional pluralism and thus breathe new life 
into constitutionalism in the postnational era, she concedes that global constitutionalism 
concerns more than good translation.  It requires a new understanding: ‘[T]he 
multilateral and multilevel international political community [be] understood as a 
pluralistic community of communities and as a hybrid community of states and 
individuals’ (406).  Only when the changes in the concept of political community and the 
relationship between states and citizens are ‘realised’ will global constitutionalism get 
going. 
Thus, a change of constitutional mindset, on which is pinned the hope for ‘realising’ 
the coming of a global era of constitutionalism, constitutes a necessary condition for 
global constitutionalism.  In line with this thinking, Kumm emphasises that what 
underlies global constitutionalism is a ‘cosmopolitan cognitive frame for imagining public 
law’ within which the whole structure of public law is made sense of, leading to a 
cosmopolitan perspective on traditional issues of comparative constitutional law 
(262-272).  For this reason, global constitutionalism opens up new opportunities for 
constitutionalism. 
Here the discussion on global constitutionalism in the collection comes full circle.  
Seizing the opportunities opened up by global constitutionalism, David Kennedy urges a 
fundamental rethinking of constitutional thinking in the endless project of reforming 
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global governance.  Contrary to the functionalist reading of global constitutionalism in 
the Dunoff-Trachtman chapter (5-18), Kennedy provides critical perspectives on global 
constitutionalism.  Situated in the history of international law, global constitutionalism is 
regarded as one among various efforts in the latest wave to bring the international system 
under the rule of law (44-53).62  For this reason, Kennedy questions the embeddeness of 
the advocacy for global constitutionalism in the intellectual class that dominates the 
current international rule of law movement (53-58).  In this train of thought, Kennedy’s 
intellectual history of global governance raises the same question as Franck asked in the 
preface, ‘International Institutions: Why Constitutionalize?’ (xi-xiv). 
Bearing the role of the knowledge production system in global governance in mind, 
Kennedy ‘worr[ies] that those who work in the constitutionalist vernacular are often 
dressing up normative projects in sociological terms’ (60).  As a point of departure, 
Kennedy distances himself from the tendency towards ‘sacralizing the [current] 
institutional forms’ in the constitutionalist discussions of global governance (60-61).  On 
the one hand, Kennedy envisions global constitutionalism as getting rid of the straitjacket 
of state constitutionalism (62-65).  On the other hand, he urges that global governance be 
transformed even at the cost of the label of global constitutionalism (65-68).  In other 
words, what is at stake in the move towards recasting global governance in constitutional 
                                                
62 Kennedy relates global constitutionalism and global governance to the evolution from the Yale project 
on the World Order, to the Manhattan school (Columbia University and New York University) on 
international institutions, to the legal process tradition at Harvard, to the new project on Global 
Administrative Law, to the new-governance ideas, and up to the critical position on the relationship between 
the third world and international law (44-51). 
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terms is a new mindset, which would enable us to see the injustice of the political 
economy underlying the world order and give us ‘a new spirit of management’ (58, 
66-67).  Seen in this light, global constitutionalism, or, rather, a transformed global 
governance, will ‘encourag[e] the human experience of freedom throughout the world of 
corporate, private, public, and technical expertise’ and thus remake global politics in the 
twenty-first century (66-68).   
To sum up, Kennedy’s critical position not only translates constitutional ideas and 
suggests a new constitutional mindset but also radicalises global constitutionalism itself.63  
In this way, global constitutionalism can be regarded as the bridge to a new politics, which 
may come even from tribal nationalism or religious fundamentalism among other sources 
of ‘revolutionary energy’ (66).64   If global constitutionalism is inflated to include 
anything and everything that we may tend to associate with the bringing forth of a new 
type of global governance, here comes the fundamental question: Do we even need the 
idea of global constitutionalism at all?  Is global constitutionalism just a new bottle for 
old wine?  The emerging global constitutionalism seems to be facing its own identity 
crisis soon after its new birth.65  
                                                
63 It should be noted that Kennedy holds a less than sympathetic view of global constitutionalism. The 
author thanks Jeff Dunoff for pointing out this aspect. 
64 According to Kennedy, other possible sources of political force include the Iraq War, the emergence of 
new leadership across Latin America, the decline of the European project, the rise of China, and the erosion 
of confidence in humanism and development (66). 
65 Besson in her contribution notes the origin of international constitutionalism in the 1930s and its 
rediscovery in the 1990s (381). 
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IV. LAW AND LANGUAGE: THE TWO FACES OF THE EMERGING 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
While global constitutionalism is different from the traditional state model of 
constitutionalism, the typology of global constitutionalism further indicates that global 
constitutionalism itself has plural meanings. 66  As Kennedy notes, the plurality of 
meanings centred on global constitutionalism not only shows the complexity in translating 
constitutionalism into what is expected to give form and substance to the juridified view 
of the world order (60-65).67  Moreover, it suggests the ambiguity concerning the identity 
of global constitutionalism, which sits at the crossroads of law and language.  To pursue 
                                                
66 Although this article concentrates only on the types of global constitutionalism discussed in the Dunoff 
and Trachtman collection, it is noteworthy that there may be another type of global constitutionalism, which 
is centred on the idea of ‘societal constitution’. See Teubner (2010), n 5 above; Teubner (2004), n 5 above. 
What is characteristic of this constitutional avant-gardism is a practice-based concept of socio-legal norms 
of the transnational regulatory networks, public and private. To the extent that the transnational regulatory 
norms supplement or even supplant positive legal norms, they may be regarded as obtaining a constitutional 
status vis-à-vis existing transnational or domestic regulatory legal frameworks. See Teubner (2010), n 5 
above, 331-334. Whether this private or hybrid networked regime can be understood as a source of authority 
and categorised as another type of global constitutionalism is beyond the scope of this article. Cf D. Grimm, 
‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a Changed World’ in The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism?, n 5 above, 3, 19-20. For a critical view of the role of private regulatory regimes in 
global governance, see C. Offe, ‘Governance: An “Empty Signifier”?’ (2009) 16 Constellations 550, 
551-554. For a critique of legal scholarship on the relationship between global regulatory regimes and global 
constitutionalism, see M.-S. Kuo, ‘Between Fragmentation and Unity: The Uneasy Relationship between 
Global Administrative Law and Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 10 San Diego International Law Journal 
439-467. 
67 For the relationship between juridification/ legalisation and constitutionalisation, see Grimm, n 52 
above, 458-459. See also Grimm, n 66 above, 19. 
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this line of inquiry, constitutional pluralism, which has occupied centre stage in the 
contributions from Kumm, Halberstam, and Maduro,68 is brought to the fore, providing 
the prism through which the state of global constitutionalism can be duly assessed.  A 
close inspection on how constitutional pluralism is considered an answer to potential 
constitutional conflicts not only shows the possibilities and limitations of constitutional 
pluralism but also illuminates global constitutionalism as sitting at the crossroads of law 
and language.  Before showing how global constitutionalism is related to nomos and 
narratives, let us focus on the issue of constitutionalism in plurality again, albeit through 
the lens of constitutional pluralism this time. 
 
A. Constitutionalism in plurality redux: constitutional pluralism as the 
keynote of global constitutionalism 
The idea of constitutional pluralism is centred on the plurality of constitutional orders in 
today’s globalising world (chs 10-13).  Specifically, global constitutionalism adds four 
layers of complexity to the imbroglio of constitutional orders over traditional issues 
addressed in comparative constitutional law literature.69   
First, the supranational legality of international/ regional legal bodies as a result of 
their constitutionalisation transforms the relationship between the constitutionalised 
                                                
68 In sum, seven out of the thirteen chapters note the idea of constitutional pluralism. See n 45 above and 
accompanying text. 
69 See Rosenfeld, n 11 above, 418-427. 
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supranational entities and their member states (234).70  The much discussed jurisdictional 
disputes between the ECJ and national constitutional courts of the EU member states in 
regard to the interpretation of the EU law and its foundational treaties are exemplary.71 
Second, as a treaty-based regime becomes constitutionalised, the relationship among 
its constituent state members is placed under a supranational umbrella, thereby moving 
away from the international system towards constitutional ordering.72  While not all 
aspects of the inter-member state relationship in the EU have moved to the constitutional 
domain, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters among the member states, for 
example, have not been entirely exempt from the constitutional scrutiny of the ECJ, even 
when the so-called third pillar in the pre-Lisbon Treaty structure was in place and not 
supranational per se.73 
Third, with the possible burgeoning of constitutionalised supranational bodies, their 
interactions with each other and other extramural constitutional orders further complicates 
the crisscrossing of constitutional orders (279-288).  The foremost example is the 
relationship between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the ECJ.  With 
                                                
70 See also M. Claes, The National Court’s Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 
71 See generally A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart, 1998). See also Claes, n 70 above. 
72 Cf L. Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) 10. 
73  See J. Wouters at al., ‘European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon: Introductory Remarks’ in 
European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon, n 24 above, 1, 8. See also Claes, n 70 above, 575-591. 
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the constitutionalisation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) system,74 
the delineation of the jurisdiction between the ECtHR and the ECJ in interpreting the 
ECHR poses new challenges to the plurality of constitutional orders in Europe.75  
Fourth, overlayering the imbroglio of constitutional orders is the complex 
relationship between different international law regimes and their status vis-à-vis national 
or supranational legal orders under the constitutionalised international legal system 
(400-401).  As Paulus has noted, international constitutionalism does not speak to a 
systematically constitutionalised international legal system.  Rather, looming from the 
talks of international constitutionalism is ‘[p]artial constitutionalizations’ (82).  The 
de-territorialised, functionally defined regimes such as the WTO and the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) system parallel the territory-based 
supranational or national entities.76  In addition to the regime collision between these 
partially constitutionalised functional regimes,77 as the recent Kadi case of the ECJ 
                                                
74 See A. Stone Sweet and H. Keller, ‘The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders’ in A. Stone 
Sweet and H. Keller (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 3, 7. See also W. Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: 
Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European 
States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 397, 
398-403, 423-450. 
75 See S. O’Leary, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between Community Law and National Law’ in N. A. 
Neuwahl and A. Rosas (eds), The European Union and Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 
23, 33-38. 
76 See Koskenniemi, n 50 above, 17. See also Koskenniemi (2007), n 2 above, 5, 10.  
77 See Fisher-Lescano and Teubner, n 50 above. See also Breau, n 53 above, 551-557. 
 33 
illustrates,78 the status of the UN security antiterrorism regime in the EU constitutional 
order has become a central concern.79 
Thus, the plurality of constitutional orders, which is the underlying theme of 
constitutional pluralism, sits at the convergence of the different types of global 
constitutionalism.80  Nevertheless, what lies underneath this plurality of constitutional 
orders are more serious questions: Is comprehensiveness still constitutive of constitutional 
ordering in terms of the increase of constitutional domains?  If comprehensiveness is 
definitional of constitution ordering,81 does the idea of constitutional pluralism suggest 
that constitutional conflict or regime collision is the inevitable fate of global 
constitutionalism?  At the final analysis, the plurality of constitutional orders as 
constitutional pluralism embraces appears to implicate the existential issue to global 
constitutionalism.  Does global constitutionalism suggest ordered global governance or a 
                                                
78 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P. Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union [2008] 
3 CMLR 41. 
79 Compare P. D. Sena and M. C. Vitucci, ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Between 
Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values’ (2009) 20 EJIL 193 with G. de Búrca, ‘The European 
Courts and the Security Council: Between Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values: Three 
Replies to Pasquale De Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci’ (2009) 20 EJIL 853. Another example of the 
interrelationship between multiple functional regimes and a constitutionalised regional body is the case of 
the ‘MOX Plant’ nuclear facility at Sellasfield, United Kingdom. After a complaint had been raised by 
Ireland against the United Kingdom on account of the potential environmental effects of the plant, three 
jurisdictions under three distinct institutional regimes were involved: an Arbitral Tribunal set up under the 
UNCLOS, another tribunal under the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic, and the ECJ under the European Community and Euratom Treaties. See Koskenniemi 
(2007), n 2 above, 7. 
80 See Rosenfeld, n 11 above, 437-452. 
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new era of constitutional conflicts? 82   In response to this fundamental question, 
constitutional pluralism promises to move global constitutionalism on the road to ordered 
global governance.  Yet, it remains to be further analysed whether and to what extent 
global constitutionalism is able to prevent constitutional conflicts.  
 
B. In the shadow of constitutional pluralism: from constitutional 
self-aggrandisement to constitutional conflicts? 
Several contributors to the book raise the question of whether comprehensiveness is a 
necessary condition for constitutional ordering.83  Suppose that it is.  Thus, as Paulus 
suggests, constitutional ordering tends to be ‘totalizing’ (109) in the sense that it provides 
a comprehensive reference framework for public authority and social life under a legal 
ordering.84  However, comprehensiveness seems to cease being associated with global 
constitutionalism.  As Gardbaum points out, the relationship between the supranational 
regime and its constituent state members indicates that state constitutional ordering is no 
longer ‘total’ because it is not only supplemented by but also subjected to the 
                                                                                                                                             
81 See Grimm, n 52 above, 449-453; Grimm, n 66 above, 7-11. 
82 See also N. Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of 
Normative Orders’ (2008) 6 I•CON 373-396.  
83 In addition to Paulus (75-80, 90, 97, 108-109), Walker (155, 157), and Dunoff (201-202), who 
consider comprehensiveness characteristic of traditional state constitutionalism, Kumm and Besson suggest 
that constitutionalism as a reference framework, within which to theorise and justify public authority, must 
be ‘comprehensive’ (322) or ‘encompassing’ (389). 
84 See Kuo, n 32 above. See also M. Kumm, ‘Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional 
Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 341-369. 
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supranational constitutional regime (234).  On the other hand, despite the discourse on 
the constitutionalisation of international organizations and the international legal system 
itself, as Paulus has noted, their processes of constitutionalisation are partial and still 
ongoing (82).85  Taken together, as Walker indicates, what is characteristic of global 
constitutionalism is the coexistence of multiple constitutional orders, each of which 
figures only as an ‘incomplete authority system’ (165).  Walker thus urges scholars and 
practitioners to depart from the paradigm of ‘holistic constitution’ for a postnational, 
nonexclusive and nonunitary constitutional model (164-167).86   
As a corollary, given that constitutional orders are incomplete and partial, 
constitutional orders are not set to collide with each other.  Rather, their relationship can 
be governed under a rule of engagement or conflict.  On this view, the judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz question concerning jurisdictional conflicts between partial 
constitutional regimes is a misconception because judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz is 
associated with legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the notion of partial constitutional 
regime is incompatible with legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz.87   
Specifically, judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the supreme authority concerning 
judicial interpretations of the fundamental legal rules of a polity, is necessary for a polity 
to claim legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, ie a polity’s full capacity to legislate, or, 
                                                                                                                                             
Cf Preuss, n 32 above, 26. 
85 Cf Picciotto, n 4 above, 475-476. 
86 See also N. Walker, ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution?’ in The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, n 5 
above, 291-308. 
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rather, determine its own competence.88  Without the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, a 
polity’s claim to the full capacity to determine its own competence would be 
compromised to the extent that its predetermined competence could be changed as a result 
of judicial interpretations.89  Thus, lacking the legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, none of 
the plural constitutional orders in the era of global constitutionalism are entitled to assert a 
comprehensive jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation, thereby dissolving the question 
of the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz.90  In this way, the idea of constitutional pluralism 
appears to offer guidance on how to manage the engagement between distinct 
constitutional orders. 
Yet, as Maduro duly points out in another place, legacies of national constitutions 
have been taken as ‘the proxy of constitutionalism’.91  In other words, the trend to 
                                                                                                                                             
87 See Walker, n 3 above, 349. 
88 ibid. 
89 For the dialectical tension between constitutional lawmaking and judicial interpretation, see F. I. 
Michelman, ‘Morality, Identity and “Constitutional Patriotism”’ (1999) 76 Denver University Law Review 
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90 See Walker, n 3 above, 349. In discussing the doctrine of implied power in his contribution to the 
book, Walker rests his confidence in constitutional pluralism on the ECJ’s restrictive interpretation of 
textually conferred power and the readiness of national constitutional courts to intervene (165). The 
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contradicting his partialist view of constitutionalism. 
91 See M. P. Maduro, ‘From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: A Constitutional Approach for Global 
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constitutionalise global governance needs to be analysed in light of our constitutional 
experiences, which are embedded in state constitutionalism.  Among the legacies of 
national constitutions, citizens’ inclination to turn to the guardian of the constitution, 
mostly the (constitutional) courts, to hold the government to account for implementing 
constitutionalism in its fullness is the underlying cause of the contemporary expansion of 
constitutionalism, driving the constitutionalisation of politics.92  There emerges the trend 
towards ‘juristocracy’, which not only contributes to the post-World War II constitutional 
developments but also defines the processes of constitutionalisation in regard to 
supranational regimes.93  The role of the ECJ in the EU decades-long process of 
constitutionalisation stands out among other examples.94   
It should be noted that the inclination to turn to the court to implement 
constitutionalism in its fullness by interpreting the constitution in light of the idea of 
justice is rooted in a modernist state of mind, within which the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                             
Governance’ in D. Lewis (ed), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, Volume I: International and 
Regional Organizations (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 227, 238-241. 
92 See Kumm, n 84 above. 
93  See generally R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
94 See generally M. Everson and J. Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law 
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Hirschl, n 93 above, 214-216. 
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constitutionalism and political power is reconciled.95  On this view, the state power 
ordained by the constitution is conceived of as part of ‘a project of theory, as well as of 
practice’.96  The state, or, rather, the polity, cannot be disassociated from the idea of 
justice but is rather considered the means to complete the pursuit of justice.  
Correspondingly, the constitution that underlies the state and its equivalent is to be read 
and interpreted through theories of justice.97  As the multiplication of the functions of 
fundamental rights and the expansion of the catalogue of constitutional rights suggest, 
constitutionalism in its fullness is implemented by reading theories of justice into the 
constitution.98  This justice-oriented constitutional mindset implicates that the political 
system under the constitutional order is assumed to acquire all the powers necessary to 
deliver on the constitutional promises.99  As a result, as Paulus and Walker respectively 
suggest, constitutional orders that match constitutionalism tend to develop into a totalising 
system, not only providing a comprehensive blueprint for social life but also functioning 
as a complete order of public authority (108-109, 157-161).  This is the underlying cause 
for comprehensiveness to be regarded as characteristic of modern constitutionalism. 
The character of constitutional omnipotence inherent in modern constitutionalism as 
                                                
95 See P. W. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 
265-279. See also Kuo, n 32 above. 
96 Kahn, n 95 above, 270. 
97 See ibid 258, 268-272. 
98 See Kuo, n 32 above. 
99 See ibid. 
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described above is the matrix for expanding constitutionalism.100  It is true that the 
relationship between constitutionalism and comprehensive constitutional ordering 
characteristic of state constitutionalism cannot be generalised and even projected onto the 
global context.  Moreover, as the variegated processes of constitutionalisation are partial 
and still ongoing, what is lacking in global constitutionalism is a constitutional regime that 
can make a comprehensive claim to be a complete order of public authority. 101  
Nevertheless, as the expansive, revolutionary interpretations of fundamental rights in state 
constitutions indicate, the tendency of constitutional self-aggrandisement, which is driven 
by the urge to perfect a particular constitutional order and to maintain the integrity of its 
value system, is characteristic of our experiences of constitutionalism.102  What is more 
important, the current campaign to deliver constitutionalism beyond national borders 
originates in the same urge to perfect the particular transnational as well as global 
constitutional regime and to consolidate the values its constituent members hold dear.103  
Thus, what accompanies the processes of further constitutionalisation with respect to 
supranational regimes and the international legal system is the tendency of 
self-aggrandisement, or, rather, ‘the [individual constitutional regime’s] urge to translate 
                                                
100 See ibid. 
101 See Walker, n 3 above, 349. 
102 See Kuo, n 32 above. See also F. I. Michelman, ‘Integrity-Anxiety?’ in M. Ignatieff (ed), American 
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everything on sight to [its] preferred idiom’.104 
Seen in this light, the partialist version of constitutional orders conceived in 
constitutional pluralism may well be simply a transient phenomenon.  What would loom 
from the plurality of constitutional orders is the collision between the self-aggrandising 
constitutional regimes that compete to assert comprehensive claims on the constitutional 
rules governing global governance. 105   Thus, the idea of constitutional pluralism 
overshadows the tendency to self-aggrandise among constitutional regimes.106  In other 
words, constitutional pluralism succeeds in resolving the inter-order constitutional 
conflicts not by its ability to guide the operation of constitutional orders but rather by 
presupposing the incompleteness and partiality of constitutional orders in the context of 
globalization.  For this reason, the rule of engagement or conflict in the name of 
constitutional pluralism is not so much a law-like guidance as a cognitive frame that 
resembles language. 107   The ambiguity concerning the identity of constitutional 
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pluralism, law or language, epitomises the current condition of global constitutionalism. 
 
C. Legal nomos or narrative language? global constitutionalism at a 
crossroads 
What has been argued about the issues resulting from constitutional self-aggrandisement 
by no means suggests that the idea of constitutional pluralism itself is a misconception.  
Nor is it aimed at portraying a doomsday scenario of constitutional conflicts following the 
rise of global constitutionalism.  Rather, the point here is to show that if the objective of 
constitutional pluralism is to provide the rule of engagement or conflict to enhance global 
constitutionalism, it may function less like legal rules than Kumm, Halberstam, and 
Maduro as well as Besson suggest in their chapters.  In the shadow of constitutional 
self-aggrandisement, the success of the mission of constitutional pluralism pivots more on 
a novel constitutional cognition than an innovative law of constitutional conflicts.  Only 
insomuch as constitutional orders are conceptualised as incomplete and partial through the 
lens of constitutional pluralism can constitutional conflicts be avoided.  In other words, 
despite speaking in the tone of conflict of laws,108  the character of constitutional 
pluralism amounts to a constitutional language, providing a cognitive frame in which 
constitutional thinking would be rethought without being straightjacketed by the 
                                                                                                                                             
see G. Fauconnier, ‘Methods and Generalizations’ in T. Janssen and G. Redeker (eds), Cognitive 
Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999) 95-128. See also R. 
Hyland, ‘The Spinozist’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 805, 832. 
108 For example, Kumm notes ‘complex procedural legitimacy’ as constitutional pluralism, which 
comprises jurisdictional legitimacy and due process (290-291). 
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experiences and memories surrounding state constitutionalism.  Thus, if constitutional 
pluralism operates mainly through the renovation of constitutional language, does it 
suggest that global constitutionalism as portrayed in the book turns out to be a 
constitutional heuristics, which is underpinned by a new narrative language, rather than 
the legal nomos for global governance? 
That global constitutionalism functions as language or rhetoric is an idea scattered 
through the collection.  On this view, global constitutionalism is envisioned as imbued 
with heuristic values.  On the one hand, it relieves international law of what Kumm calls 
‘disciplinary anxiety’ (260).  On the other hand, global constitutionalism prepares a 
cognitive framework for making new constitutional narratives about global governance.109  
Nevertheless, as Kumm’s contribution indicates, global constitutionalism is considered to 
be a ‘jurisprudential account’ of ‘hard law’ (262, 311-313) as constitutional pluralism 
assumes the character of a conflict of constitutional laws.  To make sense of the 
ambiguity between law and language concerning global constitutionalism, it is necessary 
to take a closer look at the relationship between legal nomos and narrative language. 
Law is language to the extent that the law as a ‘symbolic form’ provides a totalising 
framework of reference within which the world is to be narrated, interpreted, and thus 
understood.110  As Sanford Levinson speaks of the United States Constitution, ‘The 
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Constitution is a linguistic system… It has helped to generate a uniquely American form 
of political rhetoric that allows one to grapple with every important political issue 
imaginable’. 111   Yet, law is more than language.  It is aimed to guide human 
behaviours even by appealing to legal force when necessary, apart from providing a 
linguistic system in which the meanings of behaviours can be narrated.112  To command 
the necessary force without degenerating into pure violence, the law needs legitimacy.113 
Thus, while law can be analogised to a linguistic system, the relationship between 
law and language is more complex than that analogy.  As Robert Cover incisively 
argued, a thick understanding of constitutional law requires taking into account the role of 
narratives in the jurisgenerative process.114  Without the underlying narratives of legal 
norms, constitutional law would be thin and stripped down to force, failing to ground the 
legitimacy of the entire political ordering.115  In contrast, the process of lawmaking in 
which legal nomos is open to narratives is jurisgenerative.  A thick version of 
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constitutionalism rests on a broad understanding of the legal nomos beyond the law books.  
For example, it is true that citizenship is substantiated with the catalogue of fundamental 
rights.116  Nevertheless, the meanings emanating from citizenship are revealed through 
the matrix of nomos and narratives.  The inflated catalogue of constitutional rights not 
only corresponds to the unfailing pursuit of justice but is also the legal translation of the 
enriching history of the status of citizens in the state as recorded in national narratives.117  
Thus, the meaning of constitutional nomos can be fully made sense of only by reading its 
background narratives, while the abundant narratives surrounding the thick concept of 
citizenship tend to drive the expansion of constitutional normativity.118  It is necessary to 
bring into the fold of constitutionalism the narratives that surround the initiation, 
enactment, interpretation, and enforcement of the law in order to understand the meanings 
contained in the legal nomos.119  Thus emerges a thick version of constitutionalism.  
This Coverian nexus of legal nomos and narrative language casts light on the identity 
of global constitutionalism.  As discussed above, constitutional pluralism pins the hope 
of success more on its appeal to a cognitive transformation than on its status as law.  
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Even so, as the contributions from Paulus, Kumm, Halberstam and others suggest,120 the 
emphasis is still on the emergence of global constitutionalism as a new legal nomos (139, 
147, 311-313, 333).  In light of the matrix of nomos and narratives, however, global 
constitutionalism would fail to function as a reliable conflict of constitutional laws until it 
acquires its distinctive narratives with respect to constitutionalism.121     
There is no denying that the legalist stance on global constitutionalism is a strategic 
choice with an eye to boosting the current movement of projecting constitutionalism 
beyond the confines of state constitutional law as exemplified in Kumm’s chapter (266, 
290, 316-317).122  Yet, the concern here is about the deflecting effect this strategic 
emphasis on the legal side may have on reconsidering and thus enriching the necessary 
narrative language to support a robust version of global constitutionalism.123  By putting 
out global constitutionalism as an already ‘jurisprudential account [of] hard law’ as 
Kumm claims (262, 311-313), this strategy appears to suggest that the final victory of 
global constitutionalism pivots simply on a change of constitutional mindset: from 
comprehensivist to partialist, from statist to globalist, from sovereignty to subsidiarity, 
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and etc.124   
Without reconstructing the structure of constitutional narrative language embedded 
in the tradition of state constitutionalism, however, the constitutional ethos that nurtures 
constitutional self-aggrandisement would remain intact and may resurge unexpectedly, 
challenging the cognitive frame of global constitutionalism.  If the cognitive frame of 
global constitutionalism only eyes the partialist view of constitutional regimes, the version 
of constitutionalism it implies would leave the underlying causes of constitutional 
self-aggrandisement unaddressed.  For example, if a strong version of judicial review 
focused on perfecting constitutional order still frames the contemporary campaign to 
expand constitutionalism,125 global constitutionalism would still live in the shadow of 
constitutional conflicts as the judiciary-centred process of constitutionalisation is 
deepening, despite the aspiration towards constitutional pluralism.  In this way, global 
constitutionalism would be ignorant of added values and new meanings that would result 
from innovative constitutional narratives, thereby becoming ‘jurispathic’.126 
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Moreover, without developing its own narratives in support of its normative claims, 
the ‘hard law’ of global constitutionalism is not as certain as Kumm contends (311-313), 
even if it can get rid of the straightjacket of state constitutionalism.  Take Kumm’s 
‘complex procedural legitimacy’ again.  A central element to this rule of engagement 
regarding competing claims of constitutional jurisdictions is the principle of subsidiarity.  
From Kumm’s perspective, through the cosmopolitan cognitive frame, the principle of 
subsidiarity will take the place of the notion of sovereignty, dissolving jurisdictional 
conflicts (291-295).  However, without taking the narratives surrounding the idea of 
subsidiarity seriously, the principle of subsidiarity may well fall far short of its assigned 
mission to constrain the tendency towards centralisation in the allocation of the 
competences between the higher level and the lower level in a polity.127  As Somek 
points out, the principle of subsidiarity is rooted in a Roman-Catholic doctrine, by which 
‘faith in concordance’ is presupposed and there is no antagonism within a community.128  
Thus, the takeover of the lower level’s competence by the higher level may not contravene 
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the principle of subsidiarity because the acts of the higher level are still ‘part of the same 
order’ in which both the higher and the lower levels coexist.129  In this way, the 
constitutional principle of subsidiarity is like a tiger without teeth, becoming futile.  It 
turns out that in contradiction to Kumm’s confidence, the principle of subsidiarity, a 
central element to global constitutionalism, may ‘present[] a centralising polity in a 
decentralising light’.130  
Although the foregoing position may weaken the legal claim that is currently made 
about global constitutionalism, it does not negate the cause of global constitutionalism.  
Rather, admitting that global constitutionalism falls short of hard law, at least at this point 
of time, but is still in the midst of a jurisgenerative process would bring the necessity of 
narratives and the corresponding efforts to the fore.131  While the current versions of 
global constitutionalism sit at the crossroads of law and language, facing the nexus of 
legal nomos and narrative language head on will help global constitutionalism to develop 
into the fundamental law for global governance. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The rise of global constitutionalism answers the call for a more solid foundation for global 
governance.  It reflects the continuous expansion of modern constitutionalism.  
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However, the popularity of global constitutionalism cannot be adequately understood 
without viewing the long history to rein in international politics by the rule of law.  Seen 
in this light, global constitutionalism turns out to be multifaceted and is thus tied to 
different purposes and imbued with multiple meanings.  The many-sidedness of global 
constitutionalism is enchanting to those who are eager to lend stronger theoretical support 
to global governance from different vantage points but hard to entail a systematic view of 
the legal nomos in the global era. 
Through a dissection of the Dunoff and Trachtman collection, this article presents a 
typology of global constitutionalism, which would help to distinguish between the distinct 
forms of global constitutionalism and thus to understand the multiple meanings of global 
constitutionalism.  In addition, the foregoing analysis shows that there is an ambiguity 
concerning the identity of global constitutionalism.   As illustrated by the idea of 
constitutional pluralism, global constitutionalism sits at the crossroads of law and 
language. 
To do justice to the prospect of global governance and its corresponding legal order, 
this article urges that the two faces of the emerging global constitutionalism – law and 
language – be taken seriously.  Undeniably, giving a full account of the dynamics 
between legal nomos and narrative language in relation to global constitutionalism 
without being trapped by the tradition of state constitutionalism requires a grand project, 
which goes well beyond the scope of this article.  Also, it may turn out that the normative 
substance of global constitutionalism brought about by its underlying narratives may not 
be different from that advocated by contributors to the book.  However, a nomos of 
global constitutionalism rooted in narratives will be more solid than one that pivots merely 
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on a change of constitutional mindset.  A straightforward acknowledgement of the 
complex nexus of legal nomos and narrative language rather than a strategic movement to 
juridify the idea of global constitutionalism will be the first step towards a robust version 
of constitutionalism across the globe.   
